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NOTES AND COMMENTS

the back of the note under which the payee indorsed at the time of
negotiation does not effect the negotiability" nor do the words "for
value received in one machinery as per contract" render the note nonnegotiable. 12 It has been further held that the words "this note is given
in accordance with the terms of a certain contract under the same date,
between the same parties,"'13 also the words "this note is given in
accordance with a land contract of even date between B and C" do not
destroy the negotiability of the instrument. 14
The cases referred to in this comment will show that some courts
hold that a particular word or number of words destroy the negotiability
of an instrument while other courts decide that they do not.
There seems to lie no uniform or hard and fast rule of law to follow
in construing instruments which have all the essentials of negotiability
with some added words. It resolves itself down to a question of construction for the courts. Where the words "subject to" are in the instrument
the courts have almost uniformly held that they clearly show the intention of the parties to make the instrument contingent upon some
extrinsic document thus rendering the promise to pay dependent and
qualified.
The general rule evident from all of the cases reviewed seems to be:
Where an instrument otherwise negotiable expressly refers to an extrinsic document so as to indicate that the promise to pay is to be
burdened with the terms of such extrinsic document it is notice sufficient to put the holder on inquiry and renders the instrument nonnegotiable, but if such extrinsic document is not to effect the instrument
until after maturity it will not destroy the negotiability of the instrument.
M. T. L.
Contracts: Manner in which question whether contract is entire
may arise.-In the recent case of Fuller v. Ringling, 202 N. W. 183
(XVis.), a real estate broker, who procured a purchaser of. a part of
land, described in a non-exclusive contract, was held to be entitled
to a commission, even though the contract was entii-e and was not
fully performed by the broker, where complete performance was
rendered impossible by the owner's sale of another part of the property.
There are at least six different ways in which questions may arise
as to whether a contract is entire or severable.' (i) Such a question
may arise in connection with the sufficiency of a consideration on
the one side to support two or more convenants on the other. For
example, where a common carrier requires a shipper to pay regular
rates and also assent to a limitation of the carrier's common law
"Snelling Slate Bank v. Clausen, 132 Minn. 404, 157 N.W. 643.
2 First Nat. Bank v. Badhan, 86 S.C. 170, 68 S.E. 536, 138 Am. Rep. lO43.
"Markey v. Corey, io8 Mich. 184, 66 N.W. 493, 33 L.R.A. 117, 62 Am.St.
Rep. 698.
"'Doyle v. Consdine, 195 Ill. App. 311.
' Page on Contracts,Vol. 4, page 2084-
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liability, many courts hold that there is no consideration for the separate
agreement to the limitation of the carrier's liability. Another example
is where there are several covenants in a contract and the consideration,
by the terms of the contract, is apportioned to2 one covenant, the others
are not enforceable since they are gratuitous.
(2)
One question as to whether a contract is entire may arise in
connection with the effect of an illegal covenant upon the remaining
valid covenants of the contract. Thus, a contract which consisted of
a valid covenant for an ante-nuptial settlement and an illegal covenant
to pay alimony in case of divorce, was held to be severable so that
upon the death of the husband, the valid covenant could be enforced.3
(3) Another question may arise in connection with the effect of the
Statute of Frauds. If the contract is oral and some of the covenants
are within the Statute of Frauds, the remaining covenants are unenforceable if the contract is severable. Thus, it has been held that
a parol agreement to devise and bequeath real and personal property
as compensation for services is within the 4 Statute of Frauds as to
the real estate and being entire, wholly fails.
(4) The question may arise in connection with an attempt to disaffirm part of a voidable contract and to ratify the rest. This may
be done if the contract is severable, but not if it is entire.
(5) The question may arise in cases in which certain covenants have
been performed substantially and others have not, and the question is
as to the effect of breaches of certain covenants. Thus, a contract of
exclusive agency for the sale of certain lands with an option to purchase, was held to be an entire contract and a breach of the agency
contract was also a breach of the option provision.5
(6) The question may arise in connection with the effect of a judgment upon certain covenants as merging the remaining covenants of
the contract.6
The difficulty in these cases is to determine whether a given contract is entire or severable. A definition of an entire contract is
difficult to formulate. Some courts define an entire contract as one
the covenants of which have not been separated by the parties, and
which, accordingly, cannot be separated by the court or as one in
which the parties intend that each covenant shall be connected with
and related to every other covenant. 7 The intention of the parties
as manifested in the contract and construed in the light of the situation
of the parties, seems to be the turning point of practically every
definition.8
JOHN A. MELESKI.
-'Brown

v. Wilson, 16o Pac. 94 (Okla.).

2Stratton v. Wilson, i85 S.W. 522 (Ky.).

'Estate of Kessler, 87 Wis. 66o, 59 N.W. 129, 41 Am.St. Rep. 74.
Sixta v. Lowd Co., 157 Wis. 293, 147 N.W. io42.
'Lima v. Campbell, 219 Mass. 253, io6 N.E. 858.
SPac. Timber Co. v. Iowa Windmill etc. Co., i35 Iowa 3o8, 112 N.W. 3o8.
'See 8 MARQUETTE LAw REVIEW 248 for good discussion on this subject.

